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Up for grabs? Key issues in the negotiations about Britain’s membership in the EU 
Waltraud Schelkle 
In the run-up to the referendum, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
arranged a series of expert hearings on the future of Britain in Europe. The first four hearings dealt 
with policy issues that we considered to be important: migration, employment regulation, financial 
integration, and finally higher education and research. The following articles draw on the discussions 
that took place between November 2015 and January 2016. The authors were the conveners of the 
discussions with research interests in these areas.i  
The date of the referendum about Britain's membership in the EU has been approaching faster than 
foreseen by most pundits. The outcome of the negotiations for reforms to the UK’s relationship with 
the EU did not provide any surprises. Obviously, the negotiations could not have ended so fast if 
they had not provided David Cameron with some concession on free movement of persons. That the 
issue of immigration from citizens of other EU member states would become the deal maker or 
breaker was not foreseen in 2013, when the Prime Minister’s Bloomberg speech announced the 
referendum. In fact, as Eiko Thielemann and Daniel Schade note in their article, immigration did not 
figure in that speech at all. Its emergence as a dominant issue is a sign that, after the last election, 
the Conservative government lost its agenda setting powers. The Eurosceptic wing of the 
Conservative party was no longer disciplined by the will to back ‘their’ Prime Minister in a coalition.     
The response to what David Cameron obtained in the negotiations has also been predictable, 
ranging from ‘disappointed’ to fairly cynical: he got what he wanted because he asked for so little. 
On migration, the UK government got the promise of an emergency brake that would allow it to limit 
access to certain welfare benefits for newly arriving EU citizens for up to seven years. This compares 
to more radical steps that were temporarily granted to EU member states at the time of the EU's 
Eastern enlargements, with all old member states but Sweden and the UK restricting access to their 
labour markets.  It is not a small concession that the possibility of such a temporary suspension has 
been reopened, since it deviates from the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of nationality. Labour markets had time to adjust in the meantime and it is not clear what exactly the 
emergency for UK’s labour market is, give an unemployment rate of about 5%. Thielemann and 
Schade come to fairly sceptical conclusions about the extent to which this and other measures can 
contain immigration. Austria and Germany prevented free movement for the full seven years after 
accession, but this did not prevent Central and Eastern Europeans from coming anyway, either as 
posted workers (formally employed in their home countries) or as self-employed. The denial of full 
free movement rights just weakened the bargaining position of these migrants and promoted 
employment practices that undercut resident workers in Austria and Germany. The authors consider 
it to be one of the myths surrounding immigration that there are any quick fixes.   
On competitiveness, the Prime Minister got assurances that the EU is keen to reduce red tape. This 
is completely in line with the long-standing ‘Better Regulation’ agenda of the Commission. British 
civil servants have received an almost free hand over recent months in pursuing this agenda in 
Brussels. But it is likely to go the way of every national government’s promise on the Better 
Regulation front. Like our own New Year’s resolutions, it is worthy of support, temporarily even 
successful, but an eternal struggle against gravitational forces to the contrary. Steve Coulter and Bob 
Hancké consider the case for less EU regulation of employment in a nuanced analysis, based on a 
hearing with a variety of employer and union representatives from the UK. They conclude that EU 
regulation of labour markets is certainly a force of adjustment but not predictably more burdensome 
for some countries than others. This conclusion readily admits that employment regulation 
coordinated in Brussels can affect different sectors and differently sized firms unequally. But there is 
healthy contestation over EU regulation which forces it to accommodate different varieties of 
capitalism and respond to national preferences. It is unlikely that UK regulation of its labour market 
would be much more liberal outside the EU. It is also unlikely that differentiated EU regulation can 
be simple and minimalist.  
Financial regulation is an area where UK authorities asked for the ‘flexibility’ to adopt higher 
standards than EU harmonisation requires. Just as the coalition government previously gave David 
Cameron an upper hand against its backbenchers, so has EU membership allowed successive UK 
governments a stronger hand in regulating a vital but risky export industry. The key demand in the 
negotiations was that EU members that have not adopted the euro should not be disadvantaged by 
further integration of the euro area. The outcome is a safeguard mechanism rather than a veto: the 
UK and the other eight outsiders would be able to request formally further discussions of a decision 
that already has the majority of euro area members on its side. While critics claim with some validity 
that the Prime Minister’s achievements in this area are a measure of his (minor) requests, it also 
remains that the need for protection was probably overstated, as the track record is that the UK gets 
what it seriously requests in financial regulation. Successive governments have succeeded in using 
EU institutions (including the Court of Justice) to protect the UK’s status as a financial centre for a 
monetary union of which it is itself not a member. In short, David Cameron may not have achieved 
much because there was little left to ask for.  
Higher education and research funding are the only two policy areas in our special section that did 
not figure in David Cameron’s negotiations for ‘a new settlement’. It is therefore all the more 
remarkable, as Anne Corbett argues in her article, that prominent voices from the university sector 
came out spontaneously, and almost unanimously, in favour of remaining in the EU. This happened 
despite the fact that neither policy area is harmonized or otherwise heavily regulated by the EU. But 
these voices claim that collaborative EU research projects and student exchange, networks of 
national research funding bodies and the mutual recognition of student degrees, contribute to the 
UK’s global reach as a centre of study and learning. Brexit may do more harm to these less tightly 
regulated areas for the very reason that they have been neglected in negotiations. Higher education 
and research, two major service export sectors for the UK, are also an easy target for retribution, as 
the Swiss have found. After an out vote, the EU will want to signal to other sceptic members that 
exit is not an easy option. 
The articles in this section are not part of a Remain campaign. Rather, our research suggests that the 
political dynamic of the negotiations has been favourable for the Leave campaign because anybody 
promising ‘a new settlement’ for the UK in a reformed EU runs into a dilemma. The claim that a new 
settlement is needed suggests that there has been a failure to defend UK interests effectively in the 
past. But this claim both reflects adversely on the potential achievements of the government now, 
which has after all been in power previously while major reforms occurred, and understates the 
ongoing effectiveness of the UK in the EU’s regular decision-making processes. The UK civil service 
has a good record for signalling red lines and fighting competently for its priorities. The UK has been 
rather successful in a number of areas. This simply has not left many wishes unfulfilled, except in 
exceptionally hard policy areas, like deterrence of immigrants, to which no civilized and law-abiding 
government has found humane solutions. The modest achievements of the present negotiations 
reflect exactly this state of affairs. David Cameron’s campaign to stay in the EU may thus fall victim 
to the UK’s past successes.  
 
 
                                                     
i The reports from these hearings and links to related Brexit blogs can be found on the LSE website: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/LSE-Commission-on-the-Future-of-Britain-in-
Europe.aspx. We thank Sara Hobolt and David Spence for very helpful comments on earlier versions of our 
articles.  
Maurice Fraser (European Institute, LSE) initiated the setting up of this Commission and was the overall 
coordinator of it until ill-health forced him to step down from this role. He passed away while this special 
section went to press. We are deeply saddened by this loss and dedicate our articles to him.  
